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Bisexuality and Epistemic Injustice
Abstract
This paper aims to elucidate the intimate connection between bisexual erasure, bi-invisibility,
and epistemic injustices. I employ Miranda Fricker and Charlie Crerar’s understandings of
hermeneutical injustice and testimonial injustice to articulate the harms caused by bisexual
erasure and bi-invisibility. Then, I delineate bi-invisibility and four types of bierasure (biased,
testimonial, strategic, and constructionist) to show the relationship between bi-invisibility and
bierasure and epistemic harms. To do so, I employ the paradigm case method.
1. Introduction
Existing outside of the gay-straight binary places bisexual people in limbo. In the
courtroom, it is harder for bisexual individuals to access the legal protections afforded to lesbian
and gay individuals because of the strategic erasure of bisexuality from litigation. Briefly,
strategic bierasure occurs when bisexuality is excluded from advocacy due to political
motivations. For example, in divorce court, a bisexual woman is less likely to get custody of her
children than a straight or lesbian woman. She is viewed as unstable, promiscuous, and less fit to
be a parent (Marcus, 319). Allowing courts to rule based on stereotypes about bisexuality
tangibly harms people, but beyond that, the erasure of bisexuality harms people as knowers. This
example of strategic bierasure results from hermeneutical injustice, or the inability of a
marginalized group to render their experiences intelligible (Fricker, 151).
Both within the LGBTQIA+ community and as members of general society, bisexual
individuals are subject to bierasure and bi-invisibility. Bierasure is the refusal of individuals to
acknowledge or legitimize bisexuality. Related to this phenomenon is bi-invisibility, which
refers to the failure to recognize bisexuality due to the absence of the concept itself in an
individual’s mind. The concept of bisexuality itself is invisible, which results in unintentional
harms to bisexual people. Bi-invisibility results in the constant need for individuals to explain
their sexuality to others, answering questions about if it is the same as being gay, if it is
synonymous with polyamory, or if it is simply just experimentation.
In existing literature on bierasure and bi-invisibility, the concepts of bierasure and
bi-invisibility are often conflated and rather ambiguous. In this paper, I hope to shed light on the
two concepts, clarifying instances of their occurrence and the subsequent harms. I hope to clarify
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the distinction between bierasure and bi-invisibility, but to also break down the more complex,
overly broad category of bierasure into four subcategories: biased, testimonial, strategic, and
constructionist bierasure. Bierasure and bi-invisiblity interact with epistemic injustice to erode
free and expressive environments, denying bisexual people the ability to have a full
understanding of relevant parts of their experiences, marginalizing them epistemically and
leading to other harms.
Some members of both the monosexual1 LGBT and straight communities view
bisexuality as a phase. A common experience bisexual people face when coming out is that they
are viewed as either “on their way” to coming out as gay or “experimenting” with the same
gender. If an individual thinks that bisexuality as a concept is a phase or does not exist, they are
engaging in biased bierasure. Alternatively, if a person believes that bisexuality is a real concept
but does not think that the specific person coming out to them could be bisexual, they may be
engaging in testimonial bierasure or the denial of that particular person’s claim of bisexuality.
Bisexual erasure can also come from individuals who take a staunch social construction
stance on sexuality. The line of argument posits that a bisexual person may think that they are
bisexual, but our frameworks of understanding sexuality are completely socially constructed and
could have developed differently. However, while sexuality is a social construct and its identity
categories could have developed differently, bisexuality is a useful category. Discounting the
category all together would be disadvantageous. To do so would be to ignore and minimize the
historical wrongs done to bisexual individuals (Haslanger, 322). I call this form of bierasure
“constructionist bierasure.”
Haslanger argues that there are useful socially constructed categories (322). Part of the
way that hermeneutical injustice operates is by denying individuals the conceptual framework to
understand relevant parts of their experiences (Fricker, 151). Without the category “bisexual,” or
really any category relating to sexuality (i.e. gay, lesbian, etc.), individuals are denied a
conceptual framework to understand a part of their experience that may be weaponized against
them. For this reason, it is important to have a category for individuals who identify as bisexual,
as it helps us articulate our experience to others and provides epistemic clarity in our own lives.

1

Monosexual refers to individuals who are attracted primarily to one gender (i.e. gay, lesbian, or straight people).
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Bierasure and bi-invisibility encourage the entrenchment of negative stereotypes
surrounding bisexuality in the available cultural understandings of bisexuality. Charges of
promiscuity, instability, and acting out become associated with what it means to be bisexual,
which subjects bisexual people to bigotry, misinformation, and hypersexualization. For example,
on dating apps, many straight couples will engage in “unicorn hunting,” where bisexual
“unicorns” are the prize. What this means, is that straight couples are looking for a single
bisexual person to join them in their sexual encounters. While there is nothing inherently wrong
with group sex, the objectification of bisexual people is problematic. As Anne Vetter writes,
“My queerness to them was something racy, scandalous, and exotic. Something to experiment
with for the night” (2019). Many unicorn hunters view bisexuality as a means to their own
pleasure instead of a valid sexuality in its own right.
I will argue that bierasure and bi-invisibility are intimately related to epistemic injustice.
To do so, I will first explain hermeneutical injustice using Miranda Fricker’s framework of
epistemic injustice and Charlie Crerar’s expansion of Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice
to include taboos. Taboos function as a causal mechanism for some instances of hermeneutical
injustice and, I will argue, are part of the causal mechanism for the epistemic injustices caused
by bisexual erasure and invisibility. When individuals are subjected to bisexual invisibility and
erasure, they are subjected to both epistemic and practical harms that prevent them from
expressing their full humanity. Fricker defines these practical harms as “those harms which
render the collective hermeneutical impoverishment asymmetrically disadvantageous to the
wronged party,” (162). Essentially, the “practical” harms are the harms that create further
marginalization ranging from job loss to physical threats.
After delineating the theoretical mechanisms to be used in this paper, I will explain
bisexual erasure, distinguishing it from bi-invisibility and arguing that the concepts are related
but distinct. In doing this, I will outline four types of bierasure, namely, strategic, testimonial,
constructionist, and biased bierasure. After that, I will demonstrate that the different types of
bierasure and bi-invisibility interact with hermeneutical and testimonial injustices. I will use the
paradigm case method to identify cases of bierasure and bi-invisibility and apply the theoretical
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frameworks of hermeneutical and testimonial injustices to these cases.2 Finally, I will entertain
objections, respond to them, and conclude.
The goals of this paper are three-fold. At its most basic level, this paper aims to identify
bisexual erasure and invisibility as harms and deepen our collective understanding of those
harms. This overarching goal acts as the backdrop of engaging in the consciousness-raising that
is necessary to overcome hermeneutical injustices. This, in turn, helps to elucidate individuals’
experiences, rectifying the confusion and misinformation and affirming bisexuality as legitimate.
Finally, this paper serves a political purpose. Recognizing and affirming sexuality helps to
identify past (and current) wrongdoings, correct them, and move towards a more accepting
society.
2. The Epistemological Backdrop
Feminist Epistemologies
Traditional Cartesian epistemology stresses the need for the separation of the body and
the mind, faulting knowledge gained through bodily experience for being untrustworthy.
Rationalist philosophy, advanced in particular by Descartes, stresses that in order to arrive at
certainty, the mind should reason alone, without the influences of corporeal experience (1984).
Rationalist philosophers argue that the most reliable source of knowledge is reason stemming
from the mind alone, free of bodily distractions. Experiences, emotions, and sensory perceptions
are said to cloud reasoning and create bias.
Feminist epistemologists directly challenge this notion utilizing feminist standpoint
theory. In contrast to the rationalist philosophers, many feminist epistemologists argue that an
individual’s particular situation in society is indespensible to creating theories (Longino, 331).
This is because each individual’s relative position in society, and thus her interactions with
power dynamics, colors how she interprets her world. A classic example of standpoint theory has
its roots in Marxism and explains the relations between a factory owner and worker. The factory
owner, who owns the means of production and thus has more socio-economic power than the
worker, views the worker as dispensable and less than fully human. In contrast, the worker views

2

The paradigm case method entails identifying clear cases of a phenomenon and explaining how each case
constitutes an example of the phenomenon in question in order to refute skepticism with regards to the existence of a
particular phenomenon.
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herself as a full human with valuable needs and wants, including that of living a fulfilling life.
She also knows that the factory owner views her as less than fully human, giving her a more
complete epistemic understanding of her situation (Longino, 333). If the epistemic authority
remains with the factory owner, the theories produced will continue to justify the oppression of
the worker, because the owner does not understand her full humanity. Feminist epistemologists
build on traditional standpoint theory to account for power dynamics in addition to class, such as
gender, race, and sexuality (I. Young, 279).
In feminist standpoint theory, individuals in oppressed or marginalized socioeconomic
positions have an epistemic advantage. They see themselves both from their own perspective and
how those at the top of the power dynamic view them. This gives them a more holistic view of
different situations, allowing them to create more holistic theories. In this way, standpoint theory
seeks to “privilege the margins” and grant them epistemic authority (Longino, 338). Since
individuals lacking socioeconomic power have more complete epistemic understandings, we
should grant authority to their epistemic claims (Longino 338-339). Trying to separate
knowledge from experience ignores power dynamics and creates false objectivity. Without the
recognition of the full humanity of individuals at the oppressed end of the power dynamic, those
at the top of the power dynamic will develop theories of knowledge that reinforce their privilege.
Those at the top of the power dynamic have a vested interest in ensuring their power is
maintained and either subconsciously or consciously will develop theories that preserve that
power. Failing to recognize how their privilege and power affects their ability to know and
develop theories allows them to think that they are being objective, but in reality, they are
developing theories that end up justifying the oppression of others (Longino, 333).3
Epistemic Injustices According to Miranda Fricker
By acknowledging power dynamics, feminist epistemologists are in the position to
recognize how exclusion from epistemological resources acts as a weapon of marginalization.

3

Descartes’ own theories are subject to criticism by standpoint theory. For example, in his quest to prove the
existence of God in the Meditations, he attempts to reconcile the problem of evil with the “Tapestry Defense.” This
theory posits that evil happens as a part of God’s larger plan that we simply can not understand (Descartes, 1984).
For Descartes, a fairly privileged man, this is an incredibly easy claim to make, but it writes off the suffering of
those who were less fortunate then he was. Under this view, he could justify atrocities as a part of “God’s plan.”
Standpoint theory would reject this as a legitimate answer to the problem of evil.
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Miranda Fricker argues that epistemic injustice presents itself in two forms: testimonial injustice
and hermeneutical injustice (1). Briefly, testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer discredits a
speaker based on her social standing, perceiving her as less credible because of aspects of her
identity (Fricker, 27). Hermeneutical injustice, or interpretive injustice, occurs when there is a
“conceptual lacuna” in the collective understanding of an experience, that “renders the
experience unintelligible” to both the hearer and the speaker (Fricker, 148). Exclusion from
knowledge resources marginalizes individuals as knowers, resulting in primary and secondary
harms.4 The primary harm hurts individuals as rational agents, preventing them from utilizing
their full capacity as a knower. Since a defining part of the human experience is the engagement
with and creation of knowledge, hindering a person’s access to epistemic resources undermines
their humanity. The secondary harms are the “practical,” sociopolitical consequences of this
epistemic harm (Fricker, 162).
Testimonial injustice attacks a person’s credibility. When an individual is deemed less
credible because of their social standing and is therefore discredited by the hearer(s), they are
harmed by a testimonial injustice. Frequently, there are examples of testimonial injustice in the
courtroom. In sexual assault litigation, white men are more likely to be believed by juries than
women, especially women of color (Crenshaw, 11-12). Since women are deemed less credible,
they are more likely to be denied legal protections even in cases where the accused is guilty. The
primary harm of testimonial injustice stems directly from the credibility deficit assigned to the
speaker by the hearer. Testimonial injustice prevents the speaker from being able to explain
knowledge to others, denying her the ability to reason (Fricker, 44). The denial of credibility and
reasonableness to the speaker leads to secondary harms like the denial of court protections in
sexual assault cases.
Although common in court settings, testimonial injustice is not confined to the
courtroom. For example, in the medical setting, black women are less likely to be believed when
they report pain. Doctors are prone to minimizing their pain or denying its existence. This
obviously problematic practice has led to women dying or having illnesses progress much further
than they would have had the doctor simply believed the patient (“Is Bias Keeping Female,
4

Please note that the terminology “primary” and “secondary” harm is not intended to weigh the severity of harm,
but rather to denote the consequential order in which the harms happen.
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Minority Patients from Getting Proper Care for Their Pain?,” 2019). Testimonial injustice
prevents the listener from explaining knowledge to others, which Fricker argues, denies her
capacity to reason (44). Testimonial injustice serves as a reinforcement mechanism of social
hierarchies. When individuals are systematically denied credibility, their claims of harm are not
taken seriously and therefore they remain subordinate to those in power (Manne, 185-186). In the
case of women of color being denied proper medical treatment, testimonial injustice serves to
reinforce healthcare disparities that deny black women the same quality healthcare as their white
counterparts.
The other type of epistemic injustice articulated by Fricker is hermeneutical injustice.
“Hermeneutics” is the study of interpretation. Hermeneutical injustice is essentially interpretive
injustice. It occurs when an individual lacks the conceptual resources to convey a relevant part of
her experience intelligibly to herself and others. To illustrate this phenomenon, Fricker uses the
example of Carmita Wood’s experience with sexual harassment in the workplace (150). Before
societal understandings of sexual harassment existed, women like Ms. Wood were forced into
silence, because they could not articulate their experience to themselves, let alone others. Wood
knew that she had been violated, but was unable to articulate why, marginalizing and causing her
to resign from her job and to be denied unemployment benefits (Fricker, 150).
In the case of hermeneutical injustice, individuals are alleged to be confused about their
experiences, even when they may not be. Hermeneutical injustice is characterized by the
imposition of the hearer’s framework of understanding onto the speaker, even though that
understanding is less apt than the speaker’s. In the case of Carmita Wood, she knew that a harm
had been done to her but was unable to articulate what exactly that harm was. This lacuna in her
understanding was caused by the fact that the accepted framework for understanding sexual
harassment at the time was that “boys will be boys,” or that women should “take the flirting as a
compliment.” Those in power set the conceptual boundaries for Carmita Wood to use to
articulate her experience, which left out and failed to recognize the harm that was being caused
(Fricker, 151). The background conditions for Carmita Wood’s experience were oppressive,
patriarchal power dynamics that prevented her from taking part in the decision-making,
concept-developing processes.
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The charges of confusion characteristic to hermeneutical injustice are familiar to many
bisexuals when they come out. From both the LGBT+ and straight community, bisexuality is a
signpost for attention-seeking, instability, and promiscuity. When individuals see you as
confused about your own identity, they question your capability and sanity as a knower. Beyond
the epistemic harms this causes, it also causes practical harms, or the harms that further an
individual’s marginalization (Fricker, 162). For example, in immigration law, bisexual
individuals are disadvantaged.5 Bisexual people are less likely to be granted asylum protections
that apply to LGBT+ asylum seekers and are more likely to be turned away because one of their
relationships or marriages is viewed as a “sham” (Marcus, 317). The idea that bisexual asylum
seekers can simply go back and “be straight” endangers their physical well being and patronizes
them as knowers, telling them to stop acting out and conform to the mythical norm6 (Lorde,
1984). Epistemically, charges like these sabotage the autonomy and humanity of bisexual people
by imposing accepted norms about sexuality onto bisexual people, preventing them from
rendering their experience intelligible to the world.
The primary epistemic harm resulting from epistemic injustices leads to secondary
practical harms. Returning to the case of Carmita Wood, not only was Ms. Wood denied the
ability to fully understand her experience, forcing her into silence, but she also lost her job and
was denied unemployment benefits (Fricker, 150). She experienced the primary epistemic harm
of being denied her capacity as a knower, but also the secondary practical harms of job loss and
unemployment. Had a societal understanding of sexual harassment already existed, she would
have been able to articulate her experience to her supervisor, which (ideally) would have allowed
the situation to be properly addressed and she would not have needed to quit. If she still needed

5

This example brings important notions of intersectionality into the conversation. Not only are the asylum seekers
disadvantaged by their immigrant status, but they are also disadvantaged by their status as a bisexual person. These
individuals must face biases based on both of their identities. Furthermore, their sexuality may impede the
protections that they are guaranteed as an asylum seeker. This places bisexual asylum seekers in a situation where
they can either violate their identity as bisexual or risk losing their asylum case, an example of a double-bind
(Crenshaw, 14-15). For more on intersectionality, please see Kimberle Crenshaw.
6
A common misconception about bisexuality from some members of monosexual queer communities posits that
LGBT+ issues are less important to bisexual people who can simply pass as straight when the rights of LGBT+
people are threatened. Essentially, it is assumed that erasing our own identities is an advantage. The notion that
bisexual people have “less skin in the game” has led to bisexual erasure in court cases designed to protect LGBT+
people (despite bisexual advocates asking for their inclusion), limiting the protections available to bisexuals and
further entrenching biases (Marcus, 323).
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to quit, she would have had more access to legal remedies and unemployment benefits (Fricker,
150). In the case of the bisexual asylum seeker, the individual was denied the capacity to report
their own experience as legitimate, but also lost refugee status (Marcus, 317). If bisexuality was
protected from discrimination in the same way that homosexuality is, the legal protections
afforded to lesbian and gay individuals would have been more likely to be applied to the bisexual
asylum seeker; however, since bisexuality was erased from the litigation, it is harder for bisexual
people to obtain those same protections.
Although hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are different, the two can interact with
each other. If an individual is already deemed less credible by a hearer, it is likely that she will
be at an even greater deficit when trying to render her experience intelligible to them. Not only
does she have to overcome the credibility deficit, but she also has to struggle to articulate an
experience, which with the credibility deficit, will be even harder for her to do. For example,
marital rape victims prior to 1970s reforms were not only met with the testimonial injustice of
being discredited in their reports of sexual abuse, but they were also met with the hermeneutical
injustice of their experience being largely unrecognized by society, the common understanding
being that men could not rape their wives. In instances like this, both testimonial and
hermeneutical injustice are at play. That being said, the two do not always interact.
There are plenty of instances where an individual does not have a credibility deficit, but
nevertheless has difficulty articulating her experiences due to a conceptual lacuna. For example,
imagine a bisexual person (Joe) coming out to their friend (Sally). Sally believes that Joe is being
truthful in his reports of his sexuality, but Sally does not have the conceptual resources to fully
understand bisexuality, and she tells Joe that he is just confused. She does not subject Joe to
testimonial injustice, but he is still subjected to hermeneutical injustice.
Fricker posits that the solution to hermeneutical injustice is consciousness-raising (148).
Consciousness-raising requires that individuals develop and publicize new conceptual resources
to fill the lacuna in our collective understandings. This requires collaboration and solidarity
building. For example, in the Carmita Wood case, Wood gathered with other women who
experienced harassment similar to hers and together, they developed and coined the term “sexual
harassment,” allowing them to convey their experience accurately to others. Essentially, the way
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to rectify this form of injustice is always retrospective (Fricker, 169). This view contains an
unfortunate consequence. It places the burden of explanation on the oppressed group, requiring
that group to band together in order to correct the masses. The consciousness raising process can
be further complicated for groups that are subject to testimonial injustice as well. If a group of
people suffering a credibility deficit is also tasked with defining their experience, they must
overcome being met with denial and disbelief in addition to articulating what has happened to
them (Crerar, 197). Charlie Crerar’s expansion of Fricker’s theory provides more of a solution to
this problem by arguing that part of the solution is fostering “free and expressive environments.”
Taboos: Charlie Crerar’s Expansion
Charlie Crerar expands Fricker’s theory of hermeneutical injustice to include taboos. He
defines taboo as “topics that are deemed inappropriate for discussion in many social contexts”
(Crerar, 199). Essentially, if an individual talks about a taboo subject, they are subject to social
costs for doing so. These social costs can range from social isolation to rejection by family
members to physical violence. The lack of a “free and expressive environment” surrounding the
taboo subject stifles conversation on the topic and forces the subject into silence. This silence
prevents people from being able to accurately understand their experiences, resulting in
hermeneutical injustices (Crerar, 203).
A particularly poignant case of a taboo is the case of menstruation. When young women
or trans men experience menstruation, they are typically told not to talk about it, and
conversations regarding it are done in private or not at all. People view menstruation as dirty and
disgusting, although in reality it is a completely natural phenomenon. Since people view
menstruation as disgusting, when young people ask questions about it or try to discuss it with
their peers, they are isolated and silenced. Especially with young women and trans men, this
perpetuates confusion surrounding the experience and teaches young people that they should feel
ashamed of their bodies and bodily functions. The shame and social isolation prevent full
understanding of menstruation and harm those experiencing it as knowers, compounding the
problem (Crerar, 203).
It is useful to view taboos as partially causally responsible for the conditions that produce
conceptual lacunae and lead to hermeneutical injustice. Taboos operate by weaponizing shame
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against an individual. They stifle conversation regarding a particular topic because of the social
costs related to holding that conversation. When a person cannot express her experience, and
then upon trying faces rejection and isolation, it further implies that the experience is something
for her to be ashamed of without explaining why, creating confusion and misinformation,
ultimately resulting in hermeneutical injustice (Crerar, 204). The shame and confusion that the
agent feels creates an environment that is not free and expressive. A lack of a free and expressive
environment prevents the agent from finding individuals with shared experiences and gaining the
vocabulary and community necessary to accurately understand her experience (Crerar, 205).
When this compounds from individual to individual, it is impossible to develop an accurate
societal understanding of the experience, resulting in a conceptual lacuna that may result in
hermeneutical injustice.
Crerar argues that rectifying hermeneutical injustice can be proactive. In “free and
expressive environments” or environments where people do not incur social costs for talking
about their experience, lacuna are less likely to develop to begin with, and are more easily
rectified when they do. This shifts the burden of explanation off of the oppressed group, charging
the oppressors with being more empathetic and open to understanding experiences different from
their own (Crerar, 197-198).
Taboos and Sexuality
Throughout time, sex and sexuality have remained a particularly taboo subjects. The
taboo surrounding sex created a multitude of different conceptual lacunae leading to the staunch
binaries, misinformation, and the demonization of sex and sexuality. When it comes to the topics
of sex and sexuality, the taboos surrounding these subjects have existed for hundreds of years,
eroding the free and expressive environment to talk about sexuality. While this taboo has been
improving in recent years with the sexual liberation movement, the LGBTQIA+ movement and
similar efforts, it still exists today, and has demonized sexualities that do not fall into the
mythical category of “normal” (Lorde, 1984). To illustrate this point, the Pew Research Center
reports that 39% of LGBT+ individuals have been rejected by a family member at some point,
58% have been subjected to jokes or slurs, and 30% have been physically attacked or threatened
(“A Survey of LGBT Americans,” 2018). In the case of being LGBT+, the social cost for
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coming out and expressing oneself is social rejection from peers and family, degradation in the
form of jokes and slurs, and even threats against the physical integrity of one’s own body.
The traditional understanding of sexuality labeled individuals as heterosexual or deviant,
with little room for anything in between. As the collective understandings developed, society
expanded its conceptual bandwidth to change the binary to gay (or lesbian) or straight. What this
binary still excludes is bisexuality. The imposition of the gay-straight binary on society leaves
bisexual individuals out and makes it more difficult for their concerns to be seen as legitimate
because it deems bisexuality as taboo (Erikson-Schroth and Mitchell, 298).
Binaries generally serve to pigeonhole individuals into one of two “neat” categories, even
though the world rarely sorts itself out like this. As binaries permeate into our collective
understanding, they squeeze out any understandings that do not fit into the accepted categories.
This leaves individuals who do not fit into the “mythical norm” generated by the binary without
the resources to convey their experiences to others and themselves (Lorde, 116). Binaries are
harmful because they serve to generate conceptual lacunae and taboos. When individuals do not
fit into the binary, they cannot articulate their experiences without incurring social costs,
including vilification. For example, during the AIDS epidemic, bisexual men were labeled
“stealth killers.” They were said to be gay men who were vengefully trying to infect straight
women with HIV/AIDS, rather than being viewed as members of the LGBT+ community who
were suffering themselves (S. Young, 51). S
 ince bisexual people do not neatly fit into the binary,
they are stigmatized as an outgroup.
This is also a prevelant phenomenon in the discussion of rights for transgender and
gender non-conforming individuals (GNC). Transgender individuals transgress the male/female
gender binary that has been entrenched in society for hundreds of years. According to a 2019
report from the UCLA School of Law Williams Institute, just 25.9% of people thought that
transgender individuals should be allowed to use the bathroom of the sex that they identify with,
and only 20% thought that being transgender is a “natural occurance” ( Luhur et. al, 6). While
public support of bathroom bills is usually reported to be a response to purported dangers of
allowing transgender people to go to the bathroom with the gender they identify as, what is really
happening is the targeting of a vulnerable group. In reality, it is highly unlikely that a transgender
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person will assault anyone in the bathroom, but transgender individuals are actually one of the
groups most vulnerable to violence (Luhur et. al, 5).
3. Bierasure & Bi-invisibility
While often conflated, the concepts of bierasure and bi-invisibility are distinct.
Bi-invisibility can often look like bierasure, but they are not the same thing. As a reminder,
bierasure is the failure to acknowledge and legitimize bisexuality. This can take many forms,
from re-writing bisexual historical figures as gay or lesbian to outwardly denying bisexuality’s
existence (“Erasure of Bisexuality,” 2014). Bi-invisibility is the lack of a conceptual resource to
acknowledge bisexuality. The relevant difference between bierasure and bi-invisibility is that
individuals engaging in bierasure possess a conceptualization of bisexuality and aim to deny its
existence, whereas individuals engaging in bi-invisibility lack a conceptual understanding of
bisexuality. In this section, I will outline bi-invisibility and four types of bierasure: biased,
testimonial, strategic, and constructionist, arguing that each is a component of epistemic
injustice.
Bi-Invisibility
Bi-invisibility stems directly from a conceptual lacuna surrounding bisexuality. It
happens when individuals, even though they may be well-meaning, uphold the gay-straight
binary and fail to understand the existence of bisexuality. Bi-invisibility happens when the very
concept of bisexuality is invisible to an individual.
Think of a scenario where a woman, Sara, shows up to a work party with her girlfriend,
Tara. In the past, Sara’s boss had met her boyfriend, but they broke up, and he has not seen her
with a girlfriend. When Sara and Tara arrive, Sara’s boss, knowing that Sara has just recently
started dating again after breaking up with her boyfriend, tries to introduce Sara and her “friend”
to two of his single (male) friends at the party. Sara and Tara now out themselves to her boss, but
everyone feels uncomfortable. In this instance, it is not the case that Sara’s boss had a conceptual
framework of what bisexuality is and chose to ignore it. Instead, it is the case that he was unable
to even register bisexuality as a possible category for his friend Sara.
While this scenario is fairly lighthearted, it still illustrates a common problem for
bisexual individuals; the need to constantly explain (and often defend) their sexuality. Vanessa
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Dillon, a bisexual woman from Austrailia says, “If I were marrying a woman, it would be
obvious that I was queer, but because I’m holding hands with a man instead of a woman,
everyone assumes I’m hetero. People think that if you settle down with a bloke, you’re all of the
sudden straight again” (Krueger, 2019). Individuals assume that bisexual people are either gay or
straight depending on their partner. Bisexual individuals are defined in terms of other people,
instead of being trusted to define their identity on their own. I n social settings, this places
bisexual people in the position to remain invisible or to have to repeatedly out themselves,
forcing them to choose between two suboptimal and potentially harmful situations. In the first
situation, Vanessa remains invisible, denying her identity because of the lack of a free and
expressive environment to express her full truth. In the second situation, Vanessa subjects herself
to potential social costs related to coming out as bisexual. If she reveals this aspect about her life,
she is subjected to the social costs of confusion and promiscuity.
In everyday interactions, on surveys, and in the media there is an absence of bisexual
representation. Failing to accurately represent bisexuality prevents the concept of bisexual from
existing in the minds of everyday people, like Sara’s boss. If Sara’s boss had never met someone
who was out as bisexual, had never served in a professional setting with a bisexual person, had
never seen a bisexual character on television, it makes sense that he would assume Sara to be
straight (or in other cases, gay). The failure to recognize and represent bisexuality pushes
bisexual people further into the shadows, making bisexuality seem more elusive than it actually
is. This is in part due to assumptions of sexuality that align neatly with the gay-straight binary.
Although bisexuals make up around 50% of the LGBT+ population, they are
underrepresented (Human Right Campaign, 2020). On the 2020 Census, for example, individuals
are asked to identify if they are married to someone of the same sex. While it could be argued
that this is actually an inclusive measure to bisexuals because the census is not asking people to
state their sexuality, it actually may be another instance of bi-invisibility due to the permeation of
the gay-straight binary. Unless the Census Bureau has a shocking amount of bisexual individuals
interpreting the census, it is unlikely that interpreters will consider that some of the individuals in
both the same-sex and different-sex categories of the question are bisexual.7 Those people will
7

Using a standpoint theorist perspective, it is unlikely that an individual who is straight would recognize the
possibility that bisexuality is underrepresented by the survey. This is in part due to the fact that people who have not
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remain invisible to the interpreters, and therefore, invisible to the resource allocation and
representation that the census provides. Since the census will reinforce the notions that people
can only be gay or straight, it reinforces the idea that bisexuality does not really exist, resulting
in situations like that articulated by Nancy C. Marcus, where bisexuals are forgotten (or omitted)
from court cases, and denied basic legal protections (314-315). This instance helps to show that
failing to recognize bisexuality results in the continuation of harms to bisexual individuals.
Taking the Haslangarian approach, “bisexual” is, therefore, a useful social category, because its
recognition leads to the correction of past and pervasive harms against bisexual individuals.
In part due to the invisibility of bisexuality, bisexual individuals are denied the
conceptual resources to understand their own experience, leaving them out of the
concept-development process.

Additionally, they are rendered invisible to monosexual

individuals due to a lack of representation. Bisexual people are forced to understand their
experiences operating within the framework of the gay-straight binary, which inherently
squeezes them out. In order to combat that imposition, bisexual people need to work towards
conciousness-raising as prescribed by Fricker. That being said, consciousness-raising becomes
more difficult in the context of taboos and misinformation, which may be part of the reason these
efforts are met with bierasure.
Bierasure
Bierasure, or the denial of legitimacy or acknowledgement to bisexuality as a sexual
orientation, can happen at both the interpersonal and more broad societal level. Bierasure does
not stem from a lack of understanding of what bisexuality is, but rather it is an active rejection of
it, despite comprehension. There are four different types of bierasure. Biased bierasure is
characterized by an acknowledgement of bisexuality but rejects its legitimacy. Testimonial
bierasure occurs when individuals recognize the category “bisexual,” but they reject that the
person reporting their own bisexuality is actually bisexual. Strategic bierasure occurs when
bisexual people are intentionally removed from political movements, typically LGBTQIA+
movements, marches, litigation, etc. so that the movement seems more sympathetic to outsiders.
Finally, constructionist bierasure comes specifically from individuals who reject “bisexual” as a
been cast into the shadows are less attuned to see it happening because of their privilege and situation in the societal
power dynamic.

Rettberg 16
category, because it is socially constructed and could have developed differently. Each instance
of bierasure results in an epistemic injustice.
Biased Bierasure
A blatant example of bierasure was articulated by Laura Erickson-Schroth and Jennifer
Mitchell in their article Queering Queer Theory, or Why Bisexuality Matters (2009).
Erickson-Schroth and Mitchell cite an example of bierasure published in the New York Times,
where an article entitled Straight, Gay or Lying8, had been published. The research highlighted
by this article set out to “prove” that bisexuality, particularly in males, is a myth. The “scientific”
procedures that the researchers used were incredibly invasive, and included measuring penile
circumference to see just how aroused men were when exposed to gay or straight pornography
(Erikson-Schroth and Mitchell, 298). This study took aim at bisexuality despite c omprehending
it. This act of bias set out to erase it, fueling the taboo by assigning a social cost to bisexuals,
namely, that they are indecisive, promiscuous liars. Bisexual people may be viewed as less
trustworthy, credible, and even sane. Biased bierasure reinforces taboos that prevent there from
being free and expressive environments. When individuals cannot talk about their experience
without incurring social costs for doing so, they are forced into silence, generating
misinformation and confusion about their own experience.
One prevalent piece of misinformation perpetuated by biased bierasure is that bisexuality
is just a phase. This is common in both the LGBTQIA+ and straight communities. For example,
imagine a bisexual woman (Katie) who comes out to her friend Natalie. When Katie tells Natalie
about her sexuality, Natalie responds by laughing and saying, “You’ll pick a side soon.” Again,
in this instance, Natalie disregards Katie’s sexuality by pointing out that bisexuality itself is not
what she views as a legitimate category. In this moment, even though she probably did not intend
to harm Katie, Natalie imposes her understanding of bisexuality as a phase onto Katie, who
attempts to render her experience intelligible to her friend. Natalie’s rejection and judgment of
Katie’s sexuality implicitly questions Katie’s ability to comprehend and rationalize her own
experience. This rejection and judgment is a social cost associated with the taboo surrounding
bisexuality. Since Natalie imposes her understanding of bisexuality onto Katie, she commits a
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hermeneutical injustice by preventing Katie from articulating her experience in a free and
expressive environment, free from taboos and Natalie’s negative associations with bisexuality.
Biased bierasure operates by rejecting bisexuality. Biased bierasers understand
conceptually what bisexuality is, but instead of legitimizing it, they reject bisexuality. Biased
bierasure serves to reinforce negative taboos surrounding bisexuality, like the taboos that
bisexual people are unstable, lying, or navigating through a phase of confusion. When biased
bierasers impose their framework for understanding bisexuality on the experience of bisexual
people, they create hermeneutical injustice by preventing bisexual people from expressing their
identity in a free and expressive environment. In the case of biased bierasure, the bierasers are
reinforcing (or sometimes creating) the social costs assigned to individuals who talk about their
bisexuality. Since bisexual people cannot express themselves freely to biased bierasers, they
incur social costs for talking about their sexuality, namely charges of confusion,
untrustworthiness, and instability.
Testimonial Bierasure
Testimonial bierasure occurs when individuals deny that the individual person reporting
their sexuality is actually bisexual, but not that bisexuality exists at large. This is different from
biased bierasure because of the recognition of bisexuality as a category. Take, for example, the
dialogue between Freddie Mercury and his (then) wife Mary from the recent biopic Bohemian
Rhapsody:

“I’ve been thinking about it long. Mary, I think I’m a bisexual.”
“No Freddie, you’re gay. I’ve known for a while now, I just didn’t want to admit it,” (2018).

In this example, Mary does not reject the possibility of bisexuality as a category but rather denies
that Freddie is accurately reporting his own experience (Singer, Bohemian Rhapsody, 2018). In
testimonial bierasure, individuals like Freddie are subject to testimonial injustice. Since reports
of bisexuality are often met with charges of confusion, in testimonial bierasure, those charges
lead to the speaker (Freddie) being assigned a credibility deficit. The speaker is not trusted to
report their own experience. In the case of Freddie Mercury, he was denied the ability to
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rationalize his sexuality, which marginalized him as a knower. In addition to the epistemic harm
caused by the testimonial injustice, Mary and Freddie suffered irreparable damage to their
marriage, resulting in their divorce.
Testimonial bierasure is an example of an interaction between hermeneutical and
testimonial injustice. The lack of conceptual resources surrounding bisexuality results in social
costs for individuals who try to articulate their experiences. In the case of testimonial bierasure,
the social cost is a credibility deficit that leads to a testimonial injustice. The negative
associations surrounding bisexuality may predispose the hearer to reject the speaker’s claim of
bisexuality. The hearer acknowledges bisexuality as a whole, but operates under the assumption
that the speaker could not be bisexual, which in many cases is partially caused by negative
feelings towards bisexuality.
Testimonial bierasure is highly dependent on context. Depending on the nature of the
case, it is possible that someone could deny their friend’s bisexuality in a way that would not
count as testimonial bierasure. For example, imagine a scenario where a man, Joe, comes out as
bisexual to his close friend Sam. Joe, however, is under immense pressure to be attracted to
women by heteronormative, patriarchal norms. Sam, Joe’s most trusted confidant, has valid
reasons to believe that Joe is gay, but claiming bisexuality in order to appear that he is still
attracted to women in an attempt to feel closer to the mythical norm (Lorde, 116). When Joe
confides his sexuality to Sam, Sam responds by saying, “You know, Joe, it is okay if you are gay
too.” Sam subtly denies Joe’s report of bisexuality but does so in order to encourage Joe to
accept his own sexuality, no matter what it is. In this instance, it does not appear that Sam has
committed testimonial injustice. The difference is that Sam seeks to validate Joe by questioning
his bisexuality, and his questioning does not come from a place of distrusting Joe’s credibility.
Spotting testimonial bierasure requires nuance. It is a highly situational case of bierasure,
but in cases where it does happen, it subjects the bisexual person to testimonial injustice.
Testimonial bierasure assigns a credibility deficit to the bisexual person, questioning their ability
to know and report on their own sexuality. This undermines their epistemic faculties by
undermining their ability to rationalize, a key component of what it means to be human (Fricker,
44-45).
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Strategic Bierasure
Taboos that generate negative steryotypes surrounding bisexuality, bi-invisibility, and
bierasure’s reinforcement of the taboos surrounding bisexuality result in a third phenomenon that
I call strategic bierasure. This form of bierasure occurs because of political motivations and
happens when bisexual individuals are erased from political discourse, protections, and litigation,
which usually results in bisexuals being cast out of the LGBT+ movement and community. The
stigmatization and silencing of bisexual individuals resulting from other forms of bierasure
render bisexuality as a percieved threat to LGBT+ rights advocacy. Strategic bierasure forces
would-be advocates to settle for excluding bisexuals to secure the rights of the monosexual queer
community.
Strategic bierasure is itself a social cost generated by taboos surrounding bisexuality.
Since bisexual individuals can not articulate their experience in a free and expressive
environment, negative steryotypes develop which makes bisexuality seem to be a threat to
would-be advocates. For example, strategic bierasure formalizes the erasure of bisexuals from
discourse and legal settings, leading to more practical harms. This form of bierasure occurs
usually from within the LGBT+ community as a result of living in a society whose bandwidth is
wide enough to comprehend gay and straight, but not bisexual. An example of this type of
bierasure can be seen in recent LGBT+ litigation, specifically Obergefell v. Hodges, t he
landmark Supreme Court Case that deemed same-sex marriage legal. In Obergefell, b isexuality
is not mentioned once, despite bisexual legal advocates asking for the inclusion of bisexuals in
this important protection (Marcus, 323). Obergefell is not the exception: most recent LGBT+
rights litigation completely excludes talk of bisexuality.9
It is likely that the intent of the litigators that left out “bisexual” from this case did so to
ensure support for the cause of same-sex marriage by presenting it as a simple issue. That being
said, excluding bisexuals from LGBT+ litigation fails to protect a large group within the LGBT+
community. Bisexual individuals are less likely to be seen as sympathetic plaintiffs by the court
due to perceptions of promiscuity and instability. Without legal protections, this can have
tangible harms for bisexual individuals. Nancy Marcus argues that it is because of this exclusion
Marcus also mentions the following cases for their exclusion of bisexuality; Bowers v. Hardwick, Rowland v. Mad
River Local School District, Romer v. Evans, Hollingsworth v. Perry, a nd US v. Windsor (311).
9
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from legal discourse and stigma that bisexual individuals are less likely to be granted custody of
their children and are less likely to be granted asylum when fleeing anti-LGBT+ countries
(318-319). The perception that bisexual individuals do not need protection because they can
simply “be straight” is a dangerous one.
Strategic bierasure results from taboos surrounding bisexuality. It is in a way a harm
caused by other types of bierasure and bi-invisibility. In a truly free and expressive environment,
strategic bierasure would not need to happen, because bisexual people would be able to appear as
sympathetic plaintiffs in court cases, and LGBT+ advocates would not be placed in the position
where they must decide between excluding bisexuals or potentially losing important rights
securing litigation for the monosexual LGBT+ community. The harms directly associated with
strategic bierasure are the consequences of a lack of representation in LGBT+ rights policies,
litigation, and broader societal acceptance.
Constructionist Bierasure
Constructionist bierasure claims that because sexual identity categories are socially
constructed and could have developed differently, bisexual individuals are clinging to an identity
category that is irrelevant, and that we would be better off getting rid of. Constructionist
bierasers argue that having the category “bisexuality” upholds heteronormative, patriarchal
understandings of sexuality, and it would be better if we did not force people to claim their
sexuality at all, instead taking the approach of people loving whoever they love without labels.
It is the case that sexual identity categories are socially constructed and could have
developed differently. That being said, it is irresponsible to cast something aside simply because
it is socially constructed, because in doing so, the constructionist bieraser fails to rectify the
historical and ongoing harms inflicted upon an individual because of her identity (Haslanger,
313-314). The claim of the constructionist bieraser is that bisexuality is not a useful social
category. In taking a Haslangarian approach to the social construction of bisexuality, I argue that
“bisexual” is a useful socially constructed category in our current sociopolitical context. If we
were to reject the the category “bisexual,” we would deny bisexual people with the conceptual
resource to articulate a part of their experience that has historically been weaponized against
them. This would be to commit a hermeneutical injustice against bisexual individuals (Fricker,
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149). Denying bisexual people the ability to articulate their experience would not be helpful to
society as a whole. On the contrary, it would further marginalize bisexual individuals and deplete
conceptual resources further.
Combating constructionist bierasure implies the importance of bi-visability. Increasing
the visibility of bisexuals helps to break down pervasive, harmful taboos regarding bisexuality,
and allows for the consciousness raising necessary to correct hermeneutical injustice to happen
(Crerar, 197-198). Bi-visibility also provides people navigating their sexuality with an additional
resource to articulate their own experiences, preventing others from weaponizing that part of
their identity against them.
Combating Bierasure and Bi-Invisibility
Bierasure and bi-invisibility are complex problems that will inevitably need complex
solutions. However, combatting the taboo surrounding bisexuality is a necessary step to
dismantling these structures.10 Dismantling the taboo requires the cultivation of free and
expressive environments as prescribed by Crerar (197-198) as well as consciousness raising as
prescribed by Fricker (148). According to the Human Rights Campaign, bisexual people make
up approximately 50% of the LGBT+ community (2020). Even though bisexuality is a
prominent phenomenon, it is underrepresented in discourse and media. A consciousness-raising
effort to increase bi-visibility would help to dismantle taboos. Calling attention to issues of
bierasure and bi-invisibility illuminates a previously hidden problem to members of other
communities. That being said, as Crerar calls attention to, this does place a burden on individuals
of the oppressed community to rectify their own oppression (197).
In order to reduce the burden placed on bisexual people to do their own
consciousness-raising, it is important that non-community members work towards cultivating
free and expressive environments. In free and expressive environments, individuals can talk
about their experiences without being subject to social costs for doing so. One way to encourage
environments like these is to encourage individuals to be empathetic towards others. Empathetic
people are able to understand the experiences of others while reserving judgment. In order to
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maintain and create free and expressive environments, people must work on being empathetic
learners. By this, I mean that people should put in an effort to keep an open mind and be willing
to understand new experiences that are not their own. This is not to say that individuals who do
not belong to the bisexual community should be expected to perfectly understand bisexuality,
bierasure, and bi-invisibility on their own, but that when confronted with a new concept to do so
while reserving judgment. Obviously, cultivating this empathy will be a process, and
encouraging bi-visibility may help to get there because as people become more familiar with
bisexuality and bisexual individuals in their own lives, it seems less threatening.
This is not a comprehensive solution to the marginalization of bisexual individuals, but it
is a necessary goal in order to achieve acceptance of the bisexual community. It is also not a
simple solution. In order to cultivate the free and expressive environment, individuals will need
to confront their own biases against bisexual people (and other sexual minorities). This can cause
people to feel shame, which may cause individuals to become defensive and initially reject
progress. That being said, although the cultivation of a free and expressive environment will
inevitably be met with growing pains, it needs to be done in order to move towards acceptance of
bisexual people.
4. Objections Considered
Occam’s Razor
A potential objection to this research is that breaking down bierasure into four categories
violates Occam’s Razor, introducing unnecessary concepts in an attempt to explain a
phenomenon. The objectioner would argue that since I suggest that taboos are operative in the
bierasure it would be more apt to collapse these categories, as the shared solution has to do
primarily with breaking down harmful taboos. The differences between the bierasures are
nuanced, and distinguishing between each type seems less useful in light of a shared solution.
Instead of overcomplicating the theoretical framework of bierasure by introducing more
categories, the objectioner would argue that I should instead focus on defining bierasure as one
category in light of the operation of the taboo. The delineation of categories overcomplicates the
discussion in an unnecessary way. What is necessary for understanding bierasure is not
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understanding each individual instance of it, but rather its interaction with the taboo surrounding
bisexuality.
Although bierasure is heavily influenced by taboos, it is not the case that delineating the
four categories introduces unnecessary concepts. In each case, the taboo operates differently, and
constructionist bierasure is caused by a difference in strategies for overcoming oppression rather
than a taboo. Unlike testimonial and strategic bierasure, biased bierasure denies the existence of
bisexuality as a category. It promotes the idea that people who claim to be bisexual are
promiscuous liars and seeks to actively assign social costs to bisexual people by reinforcing
negative stereotypes. In contrast, strategic bierasure is an example of one of the social costs that
bisexual people face. The omission of bisexuality from litigation and political movements occurs
because of the negative feelings towards bisexuality that permeate our collective understanding.
The cases of testimonial and constructionist bierasure are even more distinct than the
cases of biased and strategic. Constructionist bierasure operates differently than the other three
types in that it has to do with strategy more so than an operative taboo. What I mean by this is
that constructionist bierasure recognizes the marginalization that sexual discrimination causes as
a

legitimate

problem,

but

their

approach

to

overcoming

it

differs. Instead

of

consciousness-raising, the constructionist bieraser seeks to eliminate the category completely.
Testimonial bierasure occurs when a credibility deficit is assigned to the speaker. The hearer
believes in bisexuality at large, but not that the particular individual talking to them is “actually”
bisexual. It is a case of testimonial injustice that occurs in the background conditions of a
collective lack of understanding of bisexuality.
This is to say that the differences between the types of bierasure may be subtle, but they
are relevant. Understanding the differences between the bierasures allows us to recognize the
different ways that the taboo interacts with bisexuality in different contexts. While eliminating
the taboo would help to relieve most of the forms of bierasure, there is still value in fully
understanding how it operates in each case because doing so grants us insight into the nuance of
the problem, and how the deconstruction of the taboo will have to be nuanced as well.
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Political Expediency
From a pragmatic perspective, it could be argued that the expansion of bierasure and
bi-invisibility that I offer actually undermines the political goal of consciousness-raising. The
objector would argue that the introduction of context-dependent categories of bierasure is a
rhetorically ineffective way to garner political support. The objection asserts that the introduction
of more categories alienates would-be allies by taking already confusing concepts, bierasure and
bi-invisibility, and making them more confusing. In doing so, this work actually subverts
consciousness raising efforts by making the concepts of bierasure and bi-invisibility more
nuanced and abstract. Instead, in order to garner more widespread support for bisexual
acceptance, a more rhetorically focused definition is needed. This would allow for bisexual
individuals to mobilize more people and generate a more effective consciousness-raising
movement.
In responding to this objection, it is important to reiterate that part of my goal in this
work is to offer complete definitions of bierasure and bi-invisibility. The consciousness-raising
required to correct bierasure and bi-invisibility is not undermined by offering a more complete
definition of bierasure. Hermeneutical injustices, like the injustices caused by bierasure and
bi-invisibility, occur when there are holes in the conceptual resources available for understanding
a phenomenon, like bisexuality. Introducing the four categories of bierasure provides necessary
conceptual resources for articulating the harms caused to bisexual individuals by bierasers.
Without a precise, complete definition bisexual people are left without the tools needed to
articulate the harms caused by bierasure, which makes consciousness raising impossible.
Moral Reasonability
The “moral reasonability” objection is related to the political expediency objection. It
calls into question if it is reasonable to expect every individual to understand and work towards
rectifying bierasure and bi-invisibility. The objector, in this case, would argue that it is
impossible to expect individuals, who may never have come into contact with someone who is
openly bisexual and may be completely unaware of bierasure and bi-invisibility, to work towards
rectifying the injustices caused by bierasure and bi-invisibility. Since part of rectifying bierasure
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and bi-invisibility requires awareness of the phenomenon, expecting people who do not have this
awareness to help rectify the hermeneutical injustices caused it not a reasonable charge.
While a lack of understanding is a legitimate obstacle that bisexual advocates need to
overcome, it is reasonable to expect that overcoming this lack of understanding is possible. It
would be misguided for bisexual advocates to expect that people already comprehend bierasure
and bi-invisibility, especially people who have not come into contact with these phenomena
before. That is part of the reason that consciousness-raising is necessary: to explain the
experience of bisexual individuals to non-community members and elucidate the harms caused
by marginalization. That being said, it is not an unreasonable expectation for non-community
members to foster free and expressive environments and to be empathetic learners. Bisexual
advocates and their allies do need to participate in consciousness raising in order for their
concerns to be heard, but the moral accountability of non-community members rests in their
ability to reserve judgment, be empathetic, and approach learning about experiences different
from theirs from an open-minded perspective.
5. Conclusion
Epistemic injustice, particularly hermeneutical and testimonial injustices can help us
understand the harms created by bi-invisibility and bierasure, allowing us to work towards
rectifying them. In order to fully understand how bierasure and bi-invisibility operate, we must
recognize them as tools of epistemic marginalization that lead to secondary political and
practical harms. Bierasure and bi-invisibility help to generate and uphold taboos surrounding
bisexuality, preventing a free and expressive environment from forming.
In order to rectify the harms caused by bierasure and bi-invisibility, it is important to
instead encourage bi-visability. The visibility of bisexuals will help provide people with
conceptual resources for understanding their own sexuality, break down the harmful taboos
surrounding bisexuality as a whole, and help to encourage the free and expressive environments
that make us better knowers.
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